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I INTRODUCTION
The law has traditionally recognised the home as a private and passive space, wherein there is a reasonable expectation of privacy.
1 Cory J in the Canadian case R v Silveira stated that 'there is no place on Earth where persons can have a greater expectation of privacy than within their dwelling house.' 2 The smart home marks a new frontier in the digital disruption caused by the emergence of the Internet of Things landscape. While the smart home promises users unparalleled freedom and flexibility, there is a risk that the devices converging to create the smart environment may have poor in-built security measures, making infiltration attractive to hackers. 3 The dangers are especially prevalent in a world where smart home devices are becoming progressively interconnected in the amount of data that is transferred and stored between them. 4 The smart home, therefore, presents a primary example of the challenges facing an increasingly digitised society. Given the steady increase in demand for smart home device products, and the relative concerns which have been raised as to their level of security and consumer privacy protection capabilities, the problems presented by the insecurity of data and its systems arise as significant concerns in the smart home environment.
Interconnection of sensing and actuating devices providing the ability to share information across platforms through a unified framework, developing a common operating picture for enabling innovative applications. This is achieved by seamless ubiquitous sensing, data analytics and information representation with cloud computing as the unifying framework. 10 The smart home is concentrated on 'smart connectivity of objects with existing networks and contextaware computation using network resources.' 11 The smart home signals a shift in the increase of invisible infrastructure, where technology is no longer monolithic but now has a malleable duality, capable of constant change. 12 It is a point of intense contact between the user and the device. 13 Through the implementation of smart home devices, the ultimate vision is to create 'ambient computing' in the home where 'smart devices disappear into the background, consumers only [having] to consider the tasks they want performed, and no longer have to consider which device … will be capable of performing that task.' 14 In order to achieve this, various computational nodes ('smart home devices') are connected in the home. Hidden within these smart home devices are advanced technological processes of collection, storage and use. 15 For example, the smart television, with its abilities of content sharing and web browsing, is widely considered a major step towards the convergence of computing and entertainment. 16 Two issues arise in the context of the smart home: the collection, and the consolidation of, information.
1
Collection and Consolidation of Information
Smart home devices can be generally categorised into four segments: safety, health, energy and entertainment orientated devices. 17 Manufacturers and software providers of smart home devices, provided they meet the annual turnover requirement of over three million Australian dollars per financial year, 18 may be regulated by the Privacy Act 1988 (Cth) ('Privacy Act') in relation to obligations regarding online privacy and data protection. 19 The manner in which data is collected is 8 Tsoi and Milner, above n 7, 191. 15 Andrejevic and Burdon, above n 12; Barnard-Wills et al, above n 12; Sivaraman et al, above n 3. 16 A smart television can either be smart by design or 'made smart' by connection to a set-top box such as Apple TV. 17 Rambus, 'Cyber Security in the Era of the Smart Home' (White paper, 2016) 3; Sivaraman et al, above n 3, 5. 18 Privacy Act 1988 (Cth) s 6D(1). 19 Ibid. Stephen Corones and Juliet Davis, 'Protecting Consumer Privacy and Data Security: Regulatory Challenges and Potential Future Directions' (2017) 45 Federal Law Review 66-67; Angela Daly, above n 5, 481. A manufacturer will not necessarily be covered by the Act by virtue of the infrastructure constituting a smart home device, in contrast to the nature of application of the Australian Consumer Law (ACL) guarantees, as the scope of the Privacy Act is directed at the data such devices collect and share. There has therefore been recognised opportunity for interplay between the Privacy Act and consumer protection law through the ACL regime, though Corones and Davis note that a strong link between the two regimes has not been established in practice. It is still considered, though, that the ACL may potentially serve as a useful generally unobtrusive, in furtherance of the ultimate vision of ambient computing, and consumers of these devices may not necessarily understand the breadth of data collection potentially occurring in a single smart home network. 20 Data is collected and consolidated through a multiplicity of devices to provide the user with 'familiarity', storing consumer preferences such as light brightness in a smart light bulb, or temperature settings in a smart thermostat. 21 Interconnectivity between smart home devices, such as a lightbulb and thermostat, facilitate the objective of ambient computing by creating a network of sensors that detect external elements such as light, temperature and motion. 22 The devices then collect, send and receive data autonomously between each other for ultimate control and monitoring by a smart home user. 23 A consequence of modern data flow is that the data collected and sent from a smart home device will invariably be stored and received through a multitude of international servers. Though beyond the scope of exploration in this paper, considerable difficulties are presented by the regulation of such transnational data transfer, collection and storage. 24 These challenges are many and varied and are of particular prevalence from the perspective of international organisations in consideration of the varying standards for compliance across numerous jurisdictions of operation in which data may be shared.
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The unique and varying nature of data collected thus increases an individual's digital trail, and goes 'much closer to knowing and understanding the unique complexities and individual features of human beings' than may be expected. 26 For instance, the Google Home 'may combine personal information from one service with information, including personal information, from other Google services.' 27 The device may combine user data from various sources such as Gmail, Google Drive and the user's web history. 28 The device also offers third party application integration, allowing aggregation of data from platforms such as Uber, Spotify and FitBit. 29 In order for a smart home to provide ever-present assistance and functionality to users, connected devices must establish a presence in the home alongside other internet connected devices and facilitate the transfer of data between them to perform tasks. 30 devices in a smart home network by relaying data through 'transmissions' which are secured through 'protocols', typically through Wi-Fi in a home gateway router. 31 However, where information is stored and data is capable of being accessed through multiple and potentially unlimited numbers of devices, invariably issues of mixed ownership arise due to the diversity of entities dealing with data on multiple devices and managing the increasing interconnectivity between them. Richard Mason, an information management scholar, foreshadowed in the 1980s that eventually the 'increased collection, handling and distribution of information will pose serious threats to the privacy, accuracy and accessibility of personal information.' 32 The handling of such data stored in a smart home thus raises questions in relation to legal responses to potential hacks, and obligations on entities to provide cybersecurity protocols.
B Cybersecurity Threats to the Smart Home
There are three cybersecurity threats which are of particular relevance to the smart home. These are data and identity theft, device hijacking, and ransomware. The Australia Cyber Security Centre ('ACSC') 2017 Threat Report ('the Report') discusses the prevalence of these risks to cybersecurity more generally. 34 The Report emphasises the increasing sophistication in attacks by cyber criminals, but notes that many networks are compromised using 'publicly known vulnerabilities' which have known mitigations. 35 In the context of the smart home, the infrastructure of the devices comprising the home environment may expose the network to shared vulnerabilities. 36 This may arise either from poor cybersecurity protocols in a particular device, or result from outdated software nearing the end of its product life-cycle. 37 Nevertheless, hackers may target these vulnerabilities and infiltrate a smart home network through physical proximity to the home, or remote activation and access of the sensors in the smart devices.
1 Data and Identity Theft
The potential for identity theft and crime in internet connected devices is not necessarily particular to the smart home.
39 Data and identity crimes have an estimated annual economic impact of over two billion dollars in Australia; four to five per cent of Australians are victims of identity crime resulting in financial loss annually. 40 Studies have shown, however, that there is a link between the increase in the amount of personal information stored in a network and the incentive for hackers to breach that network and commit data 31 [72] , [94] . Telstra Corporation Limited, above n 5, 4. Though this figure is widely accepted, it must be noted that the statistic includes a large number of instances of misuse of authority by close intimates, such as the 'borrowing' of a credit card, as opposed to describing instances of cyber-crime by strangers. Worldwide, cybercrime damages have been estimated by Telstra to reach USD $6 trillion dollars annually by 2021. and identity theft crimes. 41 Although these cyber-attacks can be widespread, smart homes present a more susceptible and attractive target for hackers due to their complex interconnected nature. This is because the sheer volume of data stored in even a small number of connected smart home devices provides more opportunity and incentive for hackers to extract personal information than would be possible from 'less rich data sets'. 42 Where multiple devices are connected on a single smart home network, the network becomes increasingly vulnerable to hacking due to a larger 'attack surface'. 43 Access to one device may provide a hacker with a gateway into all of the smart home devices connected on that network and the data that they store. 44 The most common method of data and identity theft in the smart home is through credential-harvesting malware, where hackers bypass security protocols through social engineering and 'credential phishing'. 45 The granular data collected in the smart home through a multiplicity of devices compiles to form a unique digital profile of the user. The digital profile is capable of detailing both the consumer's behaviour, such as viewing habits on a smart television or energy consumption on a smart meter, 46 and providing essential information which may be used for document forgery, such as in passports or drivers' licences. 47 Hackers may either use stolen data personally or sell it on dark web marketplaces for use in financial crime or identity theft. 48 The nature of this personal information also appeals to stalkers, who by accessing the data may gain knowledge of a potential target's home and their lifestyle patterns, and may make inferences based on physical proximity.
2 Device Hijacking
The purpose of smart home devices is to automate processes and simplify tasks. 50 The hyperconnectivity of devices in a smart home environment necessarily entails high levels of communication and data transfer between different smart devices over a range of protocols and technologies. 51 These protocols contain differing levels of security, and could thus allow a 'weak link' to be identified by a hacker for targeting, allowing them to gain access to the whole smart home network. 52 For example, the Philips Hue lightbulb has been criticised for its poor security, as the bulb does not encrypt data before it is transferred to another device. 53 This may allow a hacker to send commands to override and infiltrate the second device merely by gaining access to the lightbulb. 54 A similar situation may also arise for smart devices with outdated software, which increases the device's susceptibility to a security breach. 55 Studies have shown that many smart home devices are configured with identical or substantially similar software and firmware, which increases the potential for a hacker to exploit common vulnerabilities in a range of devices connected on a single smart home network. 56 Prima facie, individual data from a single smart device such as a lightbulb may not necessarily provide access to a wide range of data on consumer behaviour. 57 However, preferences stored in devices like smart lightbulbs may indicate whether or not a consumer is presently at the home by sending a 'current status' update. 58 This would provide the hijacker with 'a source of close, granular and intimate data on the activities and behaviour' of the smart home's inhabitants.' 59 Further, once a device is hijacked, a 'man-in-the-middle' attack can be made between smart home devices as a result of the 'weak link' in the smart home environment.
60 'Man-in-the-middle' attacks involve the hijacker making independent connections with various devices and relaying communications between them.
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Similarly to cases of data and identity theft, unique data from multiple devices can be obtained via device hijacking, which allows hijackers to gain contextual knowledge about the individuals and inhabitants of a smart home.
62 Pieced together, the inferences made based on learned behaviour have the potential to 'paint a near complete and accurate digital portrait of users.' 63 From utilising this method, a hacker in physical proximity to an infiltrated smart home may remotely access the compromised devices and use this to create a physical attack on the inhabitants. Smart thermostats may be used to increase heating system temperatures and cause pipes to burst by altering user inputs, 64 or surveillance cameras may be remotely turned on to view activities of inhabitants inside the home. 65 3 Ransomware
Ransomware is a method used by financially-motivated hackers to extort funds from victims by blocking access to, or controlling, user data. 66 The method is a persistent and prevalent threat both in Australia and worldwide, with an 'increasing frequency and variation of campaigns' being reported. 67 When this method is applied to a smart home environment, manipulation of data in the devices may be pushed to extremes in the pursuit of revenue generation. 68 For example, distributed denial-of-service ('DDoS') attacks may be made to shut down a home network or tamper with devices. 69 Hackers may then demand a ransom through an internet connected printer to restore access. 70 Alternatively, a hacker who has gained control of a smart home network may orchestrate a physical attack through a smart device and deny inhabitants access to security devices like smart locks or garage openers.
71 Smart televisions are also vulnerable to malicious malware. Malware 'Revoyem' redirects users on smart televisions, through its web browsing facilities, to child-pornographic-themed pages, and demands payment to 'clean' the system. 72 III LEGAL RESPONSES TO THE SMART HOME Cybersecurity in Australia is not directly regulated by a single governing piece of legislation. Rather, there exists a patchwork of different laws, regulations and guidelines which regulate conduct and place obligations on 'entities' subject to the Privacy Act. 73 Non-compliance with those obligations render an entity liable to punishment and enforcement under the civil penalty framework imposed by the Privacy Act. 74 This part of the paper will examine and discuss the current privacy law framework in Australia in relation to potential forms of relief that may be sought by an affected smart home device user following a hack. Specific emphasis will be placed on the rationale of Australia's Principles-Based Regulation framework, reasonable steps to protect personal information under Australian Privacy Principle 11, and the introduction of the mandatory data breach notification scheme.
A Principles-Based Regulation
The privacy regime adopted in the Australian model is based on the 1980 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development's (OECD) Guidelines on the Protection of Privacy and Transborder Flows of Personal Data ('OECD Guidelines'). 75 The OECD Guidelines, and hence Australia's regulatory framework of legal obligations in information security, are modelled on Principles-Based Regulation ('PBR'). Australia's adoption of PBR is widely accepted. 76 Of particular interest to this paper is the OECD Guidelines' advancement of the 'security safeguards principle', which states that 'personal data should be protected by reasonable security safeguards.' 77 PBR distinguishes the regulator from the regulated. In Australia, these most commonly amount to the Office of the Australian Information Commissioner ('OAIC') and the entities subject to the authority of the Privacy Act. 78 Julia Black, a leading scholar in PBR, has explained the theory as effectively involving a shift in responsibility from the regulator to the regulatee. 79 The delegation of regulatory function is described as a conscious and deliberate intention by the regulator to influence the regulatee's internal systems of management and control. 80 The delegation of control inherent in this
theory is consistent with 'meta-regulation'. 81 PBR requires and assumes a high level of trust and cooperation on the part of the regulatee to be competent and responsible, maintaining 'regulatory conversation' with the regulator. 82 It reinforces the notion of the 'self-observing, responsible organisation.' 83 To prevent the market being dis-incentivised, the regulatee, assumedly understanding its own environmental context, self-regulates. It is assumed that these entities, through corporate culture, will maintain a level of corporate social responsibility to consumers, particularly in the form of cybersecurity. 84 The Australian model has been referred to as 'light touch regulation' by its national government, as maximum flexibility is maintained in allowing entities freedom to meet principle-based statutory outcomes by developing innovative forms of compliance.
85 PBR can be contrasted to a hierarchical rule-based regime, where 'bright line' and specific rules are adopted.
86 PBR is argued to provide an advantage over the hierarchical approach by identifying broad principles which encourage compliance with the spirit rather than the letter of the law. 87 The model attempts to prevent the stifling of progress, particularly at the design level, by not burdening entities with obligations to incorporate specific security features to strengthen the protection and integrity of a particular device. 88 However, the PBR regime has been criticised for allowing regulators to act retrospectively, increasing the level of uncertainty of consumers and regulatees as to their standing regarding current conduct and measures, and reducing predictability of regulatory responses to future disputes. It is argued that PBR provides inadequate protection to consumers by creating a corporate culture of adhering to the very 'minimum level' of compliance, hence failing to afford certainty and predictability to consumers. 89 Key to the successful implementation of PBR, therefore, is the manner in which it is implemented and the institutional context which surrounds it. Without this context, PBR's 'light touch' regulation may lead to a market consensus of risk-taking in the pursuit of profit over product safety, 90 and the use of ineffective compliance systems based on internal organisational control.
B Australian Privacy Principle 11
The Australian Privacy Principles (APP) were introduced to the Privacy Act under the Privacy Amendment (Enhancing Privacy Protection) Act 2012, 92 and commenced operation in 2014. 93 The APPs replaced the now-repealed National Privacy Principles and Information Privacy Principles. 
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They are designed as a broad 'technology-neutral approach' for application to current and future technologies, and reflect PBR by acting as 'high-level principles' to guide data management practices of entities regulated under Privacy Act.
95 APP 11 does not mandate specific security obligations on entities.
96 Each entity ultimately takes the onus and responsibility of determining how to comply with the APPs in the context of their specific circumstances and the data management practices in which they employ.
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In the context of obligations for cybersecurity in the smart home, APP 11 is of most relevance as it relates to security of personal information.
98 APP 11.1 states that if an APP entity 'holds personal information' it must take 'such steps as are reasonable in the circumstances' to protect the information from: 'misuse, interference and loss', as well as 'unauthorised access, modification or disclosure.' The Explanatory Memorandum to the Privacy Amendment (Enhancing Privacy Protection) Bill 2012 states that 'reasonable steps in the circumstances' is an objective assessment, but that 'objectively reasonable steps' depend on the 'specific circumstances of each case.'
102 It is dependent on the relevant risks within an entity and their particular devices. 103 For example, it would be unreasonable to implement high cybersecurity protocols in a device that has low privacy risks where the costs of taking such steps are high. 104 This reflects the underlying reasoning of PBR as the regulated entity is best placed to identify its own risks in its internal environment, and has delegated authority to implement cybersecurity protocols proportionate in cost to these conceived risks.
105
The Joint Investigation of Ashley Madison in 2016 highlights that cybersecurity governance frameworks are assessed with consideration of possible risks faced in the circumstance, and security measures in view of the amount of sensitive personal information held. 106 A 'misuse' occurs where personal information is used for a purpose not permitted by the Privacy Act.
109 'Interference' with personal information arises where the integrity and security of the personal information is compromised, but does not necessarily require modification of its content. 110 This would have application where smart home devices are hijacked but the hacker does not change the basic functionality of the device. 111 The same scenario could also be applied to establish an 'unauthorised access'.
112 A 'loss' is established in this context where there is either a physical or electronic loss of personal information.
3 Destroy or De-Identify Information
Under APP 11.2, where personal information is no longer needed by the entity 'for any purpose for which the information may be used or disclosed' the entity must take reasonable steps to 'destroy the information or to ensure that the information is de-identified.'
114 De-identification requires removal of personal identifiers and removing or altering information which may allow an individual to be identified. 115 The costs involved in this process are generally high, so entities may opt rather to destroy information through secure methods, but must avoid unauthorised disclosure during the destruction process.
C Mandatory Data Breach Notification Scheme
The Australian privacy model previously operated on a voluntary notification scheme, whereby there was no requirement under the Privacy Act to notify affected individuals or the Information Commissioner when a data security breach occurred. 117 This voluntary notification scheme was criticised for underreporting instances of serious data breaches and for excessive delays in notification. 118 The introduction of mandatory data breach notification scheme, which took effect from 22 February 2018, is the result of numerous recommendations by the Australian Law Reform 122 It is predicted that notification rates should double in Australia with the introduction of the new scheme for mandatory notification. 123 The rationale of DBN in Australia is twofold. First, it is so individuals may personally take remedial steps if personal information is compromised, such as by changing passwords to mitigate the potential for identity theft. 124 Second, it encourages entities to be proactive in taking steps to address data breaches and have readily available data breach response plans.
125 DBN recognises that the absence of notification to individuals of data breaches which involve personal information 'does not align with the almost universal agreement from the Australian public that an organisation should inform them if their personal information is lost [ 128 This was done deliberately in an attempt to streamline the regulatory process. 129 The DBN scheme places an obligation on entities subject to the Privacy Act to notify the OAIC and 'affected individuals' as soon as practicable when an entity has reasonable grounds to 'believe' that an 'eligible data breach' has occurred. 130 An 'eligible data breach' occurs where there is a 'data breach', the 'data breach' is likely to result in 'serious harm' to one or more individuals from the perspective of a 'reasonable person', and an exception to the requirement for notification cannot be established. 131 As the relevant entity ultimately determines whether or not an 'eligible data breach' occurs and mandatory notification is required, the DBN scheme is based on the PBR notion of delegated authority. 132 It relies on entities acting responsibly through a detailed 'risk-based analysis' and maintaining regulatory conversation with the OAIC. 135 'Unauthorised access' has been described to occur where personal information is accessed by someone who is not permitted access to that information. 136 This definition is generally intended for external interferences with an individual's personal information stored by an entity.
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The Data Breach Guide refers to unauthorised access as 'databases containing personal information being "hacked" into or otherwise illegally accessed by individuals outside of the agency or organisation.' 138 The terms 'unauthorised disclosure' and 'loss' are generally intended for internal interferences with personal information, and may arise from inadvertence on the part of the entity.
139
Where the entity does not have reasonable grounds to believe an eligible data breach has occurred but 'suspects' one may have, the entity must, within thirty days of developing the suspicion, perform a 'reasonable and expeditious assessment' of the suspected breach under section 26WH.
140 Wilful ignorance will not circumvent an entity's obligations or liability under the new provisions.
2 Serious Harm
In order to balance individual and corporate interests, the compliance burden in DBN is reduced to eligible data breaches likely to cause 'serious harm'. 142 The legislative intention for this requirement is to minimise the risk of 'notification fatigue' on the part of individuals and the administrative burden this may place on entities.
143 'Serious harm' is not defined in the Privacy Act but is considered a high threshold. 144 The Explanatory Memorandum to the Privacy Amendment (Notifiable Data Breaches) Bill 2016 (Cth) notes that serious harm may include 'serious physical, psychological, emotional, economic and financial harm, as well as serious harm to reputation as well as other forms of serious harm'.
145 'Serious harm' is measured from the perspective of a 'reasonable person in the entity's position' and what they would 'identify as a possible outcome of the data breach.'
146 Section 26WG of the Privacy Act identifies a non-exhaustive list of matters relevant in assessing the likelihood of serious harm, including the kind and sensitivity of the information. 147 In determining whether an unauthorised access or disclosure will cause serious harm, the phrase 'likely to occur' is interpreted as 134 Ibid. 147 Privacy Amendment (Notifiable Data Breaches) Bill 2017 (Cth) 10. Relevant matters include, inter alia, the kind of information; the sensitivity of the information; whether the information is protected by one or more security measures; and the nature of the harm.
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3 Exceptions
Even if it can be established that an eligible data breach has occurred and serious harm is likely, the data breach may still not be notifiable if the entity can establish an exception to notification such as 'remedial action'. 149 This exception may apply under section 26WF of the Privacy Act where an entity takes remedial action prior to notification such that the data breach is no longer perceived likely to result in serious harm to the affected individuals. 150 Whether a data breach is no longer likely to result in serious harm is assessed from the perspective of a reasonable person in the entity's position. 151 If this can be established, the entity is no longer required to notify OAIC or the affected individuals.
4 'Jointly and Simultaneously' Held Information
In recognition of the increasing interconnected nature of data transferred and stored between entities and devices, the DBN scheme also includes the concept of 'jointly-held information'. 153 Where more than one entity 'jointly and simultaneously' 'holds' personal information, within the meaning of the term under section 6(1) of the Privacy Act, an 'eligible data breach' of one entity also becomes an eligible data breach of the other entities which concurrently hold the information.
154 While 'jointly and simultaneously' remains undefined in the Privacy Act, the legislative intention of the phrase is stated to 'potentially arise in cases involving outsourcing, joint ventures or shared service arrangements … for example, if one entity stores personal information in an online platform provided by another entity.'
155 Under general principles of statutory interpretation, the class rule states that general words derive their meaning and colour from the specific words used in the overall expression. 156 When the phrase is read together as a class of words, it is possible that the inclusion of the term 'online platform', while not directly falling within the meaning of outsourcing, joint venture or shared service arrangement, may still be covered under the concept of 'jointly-held information'.
To avoid a double notification requirement, only one entity must inform the OAIC and affected individuals of the data breach. 157 Under section 26WJ, the other entities are not required to also assess the data breach. However, if no assessment is conducted and notification is not complied with, then each entity 'holding' the information will be assumed to have breached the notification requirements under section 26WL(2).
158 Although the scheme does not place the duty of notification on a particular entity, the Commissioner has stated that it is likely the entity which has the most direct relationship with the individual and their personal information will be in the best position to notify the relevant 148 parties. 159 Once an entity has complied with the obligation, the other entities are relieved of that same duty.
Existing Criticisms of Mandatory DBN: Enforcement and Compliance
The mandatory data breach notification model has been criticised for its focus on reputational sanctions as its principal regulatory mechanism and has been described as failing to adequately address the aftermath of a data breach in a practical manner. 160 Greenleaf and Clarke have identified a nearuniversal failure internationally of compliance authorities, including the OAIC, in documenting and publishing statements of data breach complaints as a major contributing factor to issues of transparency in the enforcement and compliance process of such models. 161 Though organisations are required under the scheme to publish notifications of data breaches with respect to affected individuals and the OAIC, it has been argued this alone is insufficient to make details of data breaches available for public attention. 162 Further supplementation of notification under the scheme has been advised in the form of publication on the OAIC website, as part of a permanent, browsable and searchable database, to allow recurrent aspects of breach notification to be identified by interested parties.
163 Such a searchable data base is promoted as likely to exhibit more of a deterrent effect on organisations and more effectively induce improvement of data security measures than is currently observed in compliance activities of regulated parties.
164 Without a public forum in which OAIC can publish statements by affected entities, the 'light touch regulation' envisioned by the PBR may be imbalanced given the lack of 'feedback loops' available to allow consumers to become aware of data breaches, encourage organisational compliance and complaints, and discourage data security breaches.
IV ANALYSIS OF LEGAL RESPONSES
This part of the paper will analyse the legal responses identified in Part III and determine whether those responses are capable of sufficiently addressing cybersecurity concerns in the smart home.
A Does Data in a Smart Home Device Constitute 'Personal Information'?
In order for cybersecurity breaches to be regulated under APP 11 or the DBN scheme, the data collected by the relevant smart home device must constitute 'personal information' within the meaning of section 6(1). 166 by-case analysis. Clearly, the Google Home, which synthesises a user's web history and emails, and is further capable of integrating with third party applications, will constitute 'information … about an identified individual' within the meaning of section 6(1). Even if the information did not explicitly name the individual, 168 the context and sheer volume of information stored about the user would make that individual 'reasonably identifiable'. 169 Additionally, information relayed from a FitBit to the Google Home exposes the device to 'health information' within the meaning of 'sensitive information' under section 6(1). 170 In contrast, the information collected on a smart lightbulb may only store preferences for remote-control lighting, which makes identifying or reasonably identifying an individual challenging. Thus, data stored by some smart home devices such as a smart lightbulb may not necessarily, alone, constitute 'personal information' under the Privacy Act. This is particularly so given the Federal Court's recent consideration of the definition and what constitutes information 'about' an individual for this purpose in Privacy Commissioner v Telstra Corporation Limited, 171 where, according to some commentators, the qualification may have been narrowed. 172 The situation of a breached smart lightbulb may change regarding the interpretation of the kind of data involved, however, where a hacker infiltrates a smart bulb and patches through a 'current status' update. 173 The individual would then be reasonably identifiable, as the presence of their physical location can be determined by the hacker. The situation changes again where a hacker uses a breached lightbulb to access other devices in the smart home network, where the other devices carry similar firmware with shared vulnerabilities to the smart bulb. The hacker would then theoretically be able to access a user's home control inputs and devices and commit further attack.
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Mark Burdon highlights that while the ALRC's 2008 Report recommended a limited definition of 'personal information', it recognised the purpose of DBN in Australia, alike that in the EU, is more extensive in application than in mitigation of identity theft, the principal approach of the US. 175 As such, Burdon argues that, to achieve this more comprehensive application, the Australian DBN approach must seek to incorporate rather than negate circumstances which are context-dependent.
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Under this approach, circumstances of breach constituting personal information triggering an obligation to notify may change when a device, which is interconnected with other devices in a smart home network, is breached. This may be so even where the obligation would not exist for breach of the device alone had it not been interconnected. Therefore, as more smart home devices are connected within a home, the potential for the data stored inside of those devices to constitute personal information increases. Where there are multiple devices, 168 Such as if the consumer used the device under a false name. 169 Privacy Act 1988 (Cth) s 6(1). 170 october/internet-of-things-data-should-be-treated-as-personal-data-say-privacy-watchdogs/>. It should be noted, however, that the ALRC stated a broad definition of personal information was not within the scope of the Privacy Act. This can be contrasted to the position in the European Union, where data protection authorities generally consider most of the data which is collected by IoT devices to constitute 'personal data' given the enhanced ability to draw inferences about an individual's personal characteristics within a network. 173 Sivaraman et al, above n 3, 7. 174 the volume of information stored in the smart home network almost guarantees that the information constitutes personal information under section 6(1) as it is readily identifiable to an individual. Telstra has estimated that the average Australian household contains thirteen internet-connected devices. 177 This figure is set to increase to over thirty devices by 2021. 178 Given the rise of the smart home market in Australia, it is increasingly likely that the data stored in an individual smart device will either constitute 'personal information' alone, or, if not, it will fall within the definition as part of the smart network, due to the greater context provided by additional information from an increased number of devices. Compliance with APP 11 is ultimately delegated to the regulated entity to interpret and implement protocols in a smart home device. 180 Assuming that smart home device data constitutes 'personal information' within the meaning of section 6(1), an entity may be liable for failure to take 'such steps as are reasonable in the circumstances' in relation to a cybersecurity breach of a device. 181 The expansion of the smart home market has raised concerns that some manufacturers of smart home devices are prioritising profitability over product development at the expense of product safety in the commercial drive for an increased profit margin. 182 A study which interviewed IoT designers and developers in Australia regarding their perspectives on the growth of the market identified that there are entities in Australia that focus purely on 'innovation' rather than 'privacy in the design of IoT devices.' 183 It was found that these entities aimed for 'quick innovation and pushing new products'; the legal framework 'a lagging indicator into what innovation offers.' 184 If this reasoning resulted in a market consensus or trend of implementing poor cybersecurity protocols in smart home devices at the design phase in favour of innovation, 185 and that device was breached by a hacker, 'reasonable steps' would be construed in relation to the steps, or lack of steps, the entity had taken to prevent the breach. The focus of the terminology in APP 11.1 is not on the design infrastructure of a breached device, but rather on analysing the security measures at the point of the breach. 186 The use of the terms 'misuse, interference and loss' as well as 'unauthorised access, modification or disclosure' concentrate the analysis on reasonable steps taken at the point of breach, such as incorporating mutual authentication or secure communication. 187 While the OAIC may determine that an entity did not adequately secure personal information, such as in failing to encrypt data as it is transmitted and transferred to other smart home devices, this does not materially prevent the breach of the device from occurring in the first place. The effectiveness of APP notification obligations has been calculated to be a much higher amount overseas. 196 Under PBR reasoning, the obligation of mandatory notification incentivises entities to further invest in data security measures in their devices. This is to prevent cybersecurity breaches from occurring and the need for notification ever arising, as this could cause significant reputational damage on top of the surface and hidden costs that would result from a notifiable breach. 197 The PBR reasoning underpinning DBN does not always align smoothly in the context of smart home devices as establishing the requirement for notification is not always clear.
By focusing on 'data' breaches, an entity may comply with the 'letter of the law' in not reporting 'data' breaches even if a smart home device has been hacked. Two concepts can be distinguished: a hack of a device and a hack of data. A clear hack of data, such as widespread ransomware or physical attack on numerous smart homes, would likely trigger the obligations of the scheme. On the contrary, a hack of a single smart home device is not strictly notifiable as it may not fulfil the requirements of an 'eligible data breach'. 198 While the first limb in establishing a data breach is likely fulfilled given that 'unauthorised access' is interpreted liberally, proving 'serious harm' is considered a high threshold. 199 A hacker may obtain 'unauthorised access' to a smart device, but where they do not modify the content of the device and merely observe the use of information by the inhabitants, it may be difficult to establish 'serious harm'. This sort of breach would have to be established as either 'psychological', 'emotional' or, a more probable than not threat of 'physical' harm to the affected individuals. 200 Where a hacker obtains unauthorised access to surveillance cameras, 'serious harm' may be established as the private nature of the home and the reasonable expectation of privacy within it is compromised, and the inhabitants are at greater risk of serious physical or psychological harm. 201 Thus, whether breaches of smart home devices that do not necessarily modify 'data' will be notifiable is inherently contextual. The content has to be 'defined by individuals themselves according to context' and not delegated upon an entity to determine from the standard of a 'reasonable person in the entity's position'. 202 The entity may obfuscate its obligation under the DBN scheme in these situations by either remedially acting to shut down the hacker, or avoiding notification to comply strictly with the letter of 'serious harm', but not the spirit of the term. 203 Depending on the method used to infiltrate a smart home or a particular device, these situations would allow hackers who breach smart home devices for stalking purposes to continue without the risk of being compromised. Neither of these situations result in the potentially affected individuals from being able to take remedial steps to protect themselves or increase transparency. This is counter to the intention and purpose of the scheme. 204 indicator of whether the eligible data breach is notifiable in the circumstances. Paradoxically, the increase in the scale of a data breach may decrease or diminish the chance of 'serious harm' to each particular individual, 207 and thereby fail the requirement for notification on the second limb of the criterion. Hence, 'eligible data breach' potentially may be inapplicable to both breaches of small smart home networks and large-scale breaches, such as of cloud service providers in the smart home.
(b) 'Jointly and Simultaneously' Held Information
The concept of jointly-held information may have application to interconnected devices in the smart home and the requirement for notification provided the devices 'hold' personal information within its meaning under section 6(1). 209 The application of 'jointly-held information' will inevitably depend on the individual devices in a smart home network and whether the data transfer between these devices constitute outsourcing, joint ventures, shared service arrangements or potentially an 'online platform'. 210 The concept may apply where data is held jointly and simultaneously on a smart home network and a hacker uses a single smart home device to breach the entire network. 211 'Man-in-the middle' attacks could also trigger notification requirements in these scenarios. 212 For example, 'a data breach involving an individual's name may [increase the risk of serious harm] if the entity's name links the individual with a particular form of physical or mental health care.' 213 The interconnected nature of smart home data places tensions on the conceptions of 'serious harm' and 'personal information', as when information is combined and concurrently accessible through various smart home devices through 'communication' via protocols, the sensitivity of the information increases the risk of 'serious harm'.
C Are Smart Home Devices Conceptually and Practically Compatible with Australia's Existing
Legal Framework?
The DBN scheme attempts a balancing act between individual and corporate interests. 214 The scheme asserts that individuals have a 'right to know' about unauthorised access to devices storing their information to facilitate mitigation of identity theft and other kinds of access likely to give rise to 'serious harm'. It is designed to protect those adversely affected by security breaches, 215 by letting 'individuals know that their data has slipped into unauthorised hands.' 216 The auxiliary aim is for mandatory DBN to act as a public information disclosure mechanism which improves organisational security control by encouraging sound informational and cybersecurity management as an organisational priority. The regulatory tool is framed with the consequence of reputational sanction.
